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Abstract 
This paper applies the financing constraint approach to study whether microfinance 
institutions improved access to credit for microenterprises in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
According to this approach, microenterprises with improved assess to credit rely less on 
internal funds for their investments. Thus, we compare investment sensitivity to internal 
funds of micorenterprises in municipalities with significant presence of MFIs to that of 
micorenterprises in municipalities with no (or limited) presence of MFIs using Living 
Standards Measurement Survey and MFI branch location data. Results indicate that MFIs 
alleviated microbusinesses’ financing constraint. This approach is applicable to evaluating 
microfinance impact in other countries.  
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An Impact Analysis of Microfinance in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide, microfinance institutions (MFIs) expand the frontier of finance by providing 
loans and other financial services to under-served populations. Microfinance is important in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as estimates for 2001 show that the number of people 
employed in MFI-supported microenterprises is comparable to the 72,000 workers on wait-
lists for jobs (Dunn and Tvrtkovic, 2003).
1 Among post-communist countries, Bosnia has the 
most dynamic microfinance sector and analysis of both its successes and setbacks could help 
microfinance donors and policy makers in other post-transition countries develop adequate 
policies to promote microfinance. 
This paper studies whether the microfinance sector in BiH improved access to credit 
for the entrepreneurial poor.
2  Previous studies focus mainly on evaluating the impact of a 
single MFI, usually on the request by donors who want to know whether to discontinue 
support for a specific MFI (Zohir and Matin, 2004).  This paper focuses instead on the impact 
of all microfinance institutions operating in the local credit market.  Industry-wide focus is 
important because competition may affect the impact of an individual MFI. For example, 
lack of impact could be the result of too much competition that leads to client over-
indebtedness, where clients take too much debt and borrow from one lender simply to repay 
another. On the other hand, the lending criteria of a single MFI may address the needs of a 
specific target population but may not be flexible enough to include many viable 
microentrepreneurs.
    
The impact of microfinance on the target population can be measured in social and in 
economic terms.
3 While the choice of impact variables reflects what school of thought or 
“shisms” the authors belong to, a recent survey of the literature makes the case for evaluating 
both aspects (Morduch, 2000; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).
 In Bosnia, the 
impact on entrepreneurs’ finances has been underemphasized because, in the post-war 
environment, the social impact was of main interest (Matul and Tsilikounas, 2004). 
According to the financial sector development “shism,” MFIs should lend to entrepreneurs 
who already have the skills and the markets but lack credit (Conning, 1999). Post-war Bosnia 
had educated but impoverished population with limited access to credit, which affected 
entrepreneurs’ ability to sustain microbusinesses. This study contributes to the literature by 
studying whether MFIs collectively serving a local market improved credit access of the 
entrepreneurial poor.  
The approach used in this paper avoids methodological challenges typical to impact 
assessment studies where MFI clients serve as a treatment group and non-clients who satisfy 
the lending criteria of a particular lender serve as a control group (Dunn, 2005).  Such design 
has self-selection and, in panel data, attrition issues typical for social sciences where 
controlled experiments are not possible.  In the case of self-selection bias, for example, 
achievements attributed to microfinance may simply be attributes of the most talented 
microentrepreneurs who self-select to apply and consequently receive microloans. These 
issues could be addressed in some programs where design and implementation yields quasi-
experimental data such as in Coleman (1999), and Pitt and Khandker (1998). Since quasi-
experimental data are not always available, exploring alternative methods remains important.     
This paper evaluates the impact of microfinance by applying the financing constraint 
approach according to which improvement in access to credit resulting from availability of 
microfinance is reflected in the sensitivity of microbusinesses’ investment to availability of 
internal funds. Specifically, the paper compares the sensitivity of investment to internal funds 
of microentrepreneurs in municipalities with significant presence of MFIs to that of 
microentrepreneurs operating in municipalities with no or only limited MFI presence using a 
randomly selected sample of municipalities and entrepreneurs from the Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) series of the World Bank, conducted by the Agency for 
Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Office of Statistics and the Republika 
Srpska Institute of Statistics in 2001. The sample includes not only clients and comparable 
non-clients but also microbusinesses that may not qualify for a loan by the criteria of one or 
more MFIs. Data on the municipalities covered by MFIs comes from the Bosnian Local 
Initiative Project (LIP), MFIs reports and the Mapping Survey by the Microfinance Center 
for Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States (Microfinance Center for 
CEE&NIS). Controlling for enterprise-specific and region-specific characteristics, we find 
that investment in microenterprises with weak presence of MFIs is more financially 
constrained, and depends to a larger extent on the availability of internal funds than 
investment of microenterprises in municipalities with strong presence of MFIs.  
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE MICROFINANCE SECTOR IN BOSNIA  
Microfinance initiatives targeting disadvantaged populations in the BiH started operations 
soon after the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. According to some estimates, in 
the 90s, the international community supported as many as 70 projects with some element of    
microfinance activity (Goranja, 1999). However, the microfinance sector developed mainly 
due to a unified strategy implemented by a Local Initiative Project (LIP) funded by the 
World Bank through the Local Initiatives Departments in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. LIP identified and trained about 25 organizations of 
which 17 potentially viable programs received funding and the most viable received further 
support through 2001 (Berryman and Pytkowska, 2003). Another important objective of the 
LIP was the creation of an appropriate legal framework for microfinance. This helped many 
MFIs to become more integrated in the financial sector. Some MFIs were successful in 
obtaining commercial loans from local banks, while others transformed into financial 
companies which also improved their access to funds as well as their ability to provide more 
financial services. 
By 2001, MFI programs disbursed over 20,000 microloans but served a market 
different form that of banks since the loans offered by MFIs were much smaller. For 
example, in 2000, banks offered loans starting at 25,000KM while MFIs’ loans started at 
1,000KM (Berryman and Pytkowska, 2003).
4 The lending technologies employed by 
Bosnian MFIs were also culturally appropriate, adjusted to serve the unique clientele. 
Poverty in BiH differed from poverty in Africa and Asia, as the new poor were highly 
educated and usually with good physical assets base. The potential microentrepreneurs were 
people who before the war might have had sophisticated private businesses but were 
displaced or, alternatively, people who before the war were factory workers but became 
unemployed after the industry collapsed (post-war unemployment reached as much as 85%). 
The first microfinance project in Tuzla in 1996 tested typical microfinance practices 
and lessons from this pilot program helped other MFIs develop better lending practices and    
organizational structures. For example, it was discovered that the credit union approach was 
not viable and that the most viable approach was individual lending while solidarity groups 
worked only for specific sub-populations. Some unnecessarily restrictive lending practices, 
such as frequent meetings and forced retention, also did not work well and were eliminated 
(Goranja, 1999). 
Since Bosnian MFIs competed for clients, the one-size-fits-all approach was quickly 
eliminated and many MFIs used focus groups, exit interviews, market research, etc., to learn 
from clients, identify needs, launch new products, and provide better financial services. This 
led to the development of more products and, as a result, the microfinance market was better 
able to serve the needs of a broader group of entrepreneurs and not only those with 
characteristics desired by a single institution (Goranja, 1999). 
Geographic expansion was very important because competition forced MFIs to seek 
new clients. Many MFIs opened branches and sub-branches in new locations. In 2001, the 
average MFI had 9 branches and served on average about 22 municipalities. Geographic 
expansion led to reorganization with head offices having more of a supervisory role and 
branches being profit centers, allowing for better reaction to target clientele’s needs 
(Berryman and Pytkowska, 2003).  
Two studies on the impact of microfinance in Bosnia illustrate the differences 
between typical microfinance impact studies and the approach employed here, and provide 
benchmarks to compare the results of this study. Matul and Tsilikounas (2004) studied the 
impact of a single program Prizma in the city of Tuzla. Comparing Prizma’s clients with non-
clients, they did not find evidence that program participation led to increase in income,    
number of workers, and investment in equipment, although these indicators were 
substantially better among clients with longer use of credit.  
Dunn (2005) studied the impact on client income in MFIs supported by the LIP using 
the Imp-Act (SEEP/AIMS) methodology.
5 The project collected data by interviewing about 
3,000 clients and comparable non-clients in 2002 and re-interviewing most of them in 2004. 
Regression analysis showed that participation increased client households’ income and that 
microfinance programs increased employment and wages of non-household employees, but 
only among the newest clients perhaps because the impact may occur after the first loan and 
may level off over time. This study confirmed that clients of the 10 programs had higher 
income than a corresponding control group with similar characteristics in the same (non-
randomly selected) areas. This methodology, however, does not help understand if and how 
microfinance contributed to credit market development.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
The first step in microfinance impact studies is to determine which variable will measure the 
outcome from improved access to credit. Household income or socioeconomic outcomes (for 
example nutrition) are usually the main variables of interest. The next step is determining an 
adequate control group that most closely resembles the client group of a lender whose impact 
is being studied. Statistically significant difference in the outcome between treatment and 
control groups is an indication of impact by a microfinance lender. 
The concept employed here is different in two ways. First, the focus is not on the 
impact of a single MFI but on evaluating whether the microfinance industry, through its 
many institutions, improved local credit markets. A second difference of this approach,    
therefore, is that the focus is not on the impact on income or other socioeconomic outcomes. 
Instead, we explore whether microfinance alleviated financing constraints and thus played 
the role it should play according to the literature on financial sector development. Another 
contribution of this approach is that selection issues are alleviated by the use of a 
representative sample and by controlling for municipality characteristics. 
The empirical methodology is rooted in the literature on asymmetric information in 
credit markets. According to this literature, in the presence of high transaction costs and 
asymmetric information, loans are either rationed or available at a premium (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In such circumstances, external and internal 
finance are no longer substitutes and investment in enterprises facing high information costs, 
such as most microenterpises, is constrained by the availability of internal funds (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Since these constraints do not affect all firms uniformly, the extent of 
effective financing constraints that different enterprises face provides information on the 
ability of the financial system to cater to these firms’ financial needs. In effect, investment in 
enterprises with limited or no access to credit due to missing or poorly functioning credit 
markets would be more dependent on internal funds than would be investment in enterprises 
with better functioning credit markets. 
The financing constraints approach, pioneered by Fazzari et al. (1988) simply tests for 
differences in sensitivity of investment to internal funds in enterprises with different levels of 
informational opacity by splitting a sample of enterprises into sub-samples, defined 
according to suitable theoretical priors that characterize constrained and unconstrained firms 
(i.e., criteria such as enterprise’s age and size). For each sub-sample, reduced-form 
investment equation is estimated, where investment is modeled as function of the enterprise’s    
internal funds, usually defined as revenues minus expenses and taxes and used as a proxy for 
changes in net worth, as well as controls for enterprise specific characteristics and investment 
opportunities determined from a variety of theoretical perspectives (Hubbard, 1998).
6 A 
statistically significant difference in investment sensitivity to internal funds across sub-
samples indicates that one group is more credit constrained.
7  
While the financing constraint is an empirical approach, its theoretical underpinnings 
come from recent developments in the literature on investment. Cleary, Povel, and Raith 
(2007) show that for positive or slightly negative levels of enterprise wealth, investment is 
positively related to internal finance.
8 With greater asymmetries of information between 
external providers of funds and the enterprise, investment becomes even more sensitive to the 
availability of internal funds. That is, everything else equal, enterprises facing higher 
asymmetric information costs have investment more sensitive to availability of internal 
finance than firms facing lower information costs.  
The financing constraints approach has been used to study small and medium 
enterprises in transition countries (Budina et al. 2000; Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega, 2006). 
The empirical analysis here adapts the financing constraints approach to fit the nature of the 
data, household microenterprises, and the microfinance market of BiH.  
Microenterprises are informationally opaque, unable to signal their quality to 
traditional lenders, and usually cannot provide adequate collateral to alleviate the asymmetric 
information problem either because these enterprises do not have collateral or because poorly 
functioning secondary markets for the collateral render it worthless. Therefore, 
microentrepreneurs who cannot secure funds from banks and other traditional sources of 
external funds have to rely more on internal funds for their investment. Indeed, Dunn and    
Tvrtkovic (2003) report that microentrepreneurs who obtained microloans used them mainly 
for investment in premises and in equipment.  
The purpose of microfinance is to improve access to credit for the entrepreneurial 
poor via innovative lending technologies designed to decrease problems of asymmetric 
information. The expectation is that microenterprises in regions with several MFIs, as a 
group offer more than one credit products, would have investment less sensitive to the 
availability of internal funds because they have better access to external funds. On the other 
hand, microenterprises operating in regions without strong presence of MFIs would face 
more significant financial constraints and will rely primarily on internal finds for investment. 
The model by Cleary, Povel, and Raith assumes that the cost of debt financing is 
endogenously determined and investments are scalable, meaning that change in the marginal 
cost of debt finance affects both the decision to invest and the choice of investment. This 
assumption permits us to use a logit model similar to the one in Johnson et al. (2002) to study 
investment decisions by small firms in transition economies.  
The logit model assumes logistic distribution of the probability of an event:  
()
1 ) exp( 1 Pr
− − + = i i λ  , where λ  is linearly dependent on the variables hypothesized to affect 
the probability:  i i X β α λ + = . The probability thus varies from 0 to 1 ( ±∞ = λ ), and the 
model is simplified by rearranging it into a log of the odds,  ( ) i i i X P P β α + = − ) 1 /( ln  which, 
for samples consisting of individual outcomes, can be estimated with maximum likelihood. 
Interpretation of the coefficients can be also done by reverting back to the probabilities.  
Thus, we estimate 
Z)   +   IO     +   IC   +   ( ) 1 Pr(
\
2 1 γ β β α f IFA = =      (1)    
where IFA is the decision to invest in fixed assets, IC is the variable for internal capital; IO is 
the investment opportunity variable, and Z is a vector of variables that capture various 
characteristics of the enterprise and the municipality in which it operates. Firms without 
investment opportunities would not invest even if they had capital. Thus, we control for 
investment opportunity (IO) and separate it from the effect of internal funds (IC). 
An important challenge in studying microentrepreneurs’ investment is to distinguish 
between business and household assets. A measure of the enterprise cash flow may be 
incorrect because it is not always possible to separate the capital that entrepreneurs use for 
private purposes from that used for business purposes. Indeed, microfinance institutions have 
increasingly focused on evaluating assets and cash flows belonging to the household rather 
than those belonging only to the enterprise they run (Hartarska and Holtmann, 2006). That is 
why care is taken to include variables that control for the impact of household income, cash 
flows and consumption, as well as for access to informal funds.  
This approach avoids self-selection, when possibly more entrepreneurial clients apply 
and get loans, and for whom loan “impact” may be result of unobserved entrepreneurial 
characteristics. Enterprises in the sample are randomly selected and may or may not have a 
loan in either type of municipality (with or without MFIs). If availability of several providers 
and products improves access to credit, then for both (current) clients and non-clients, 
investment will depend less on internal funds because broader group of entrepreneurs could 
get a loan when they need it. The impact of microfinance cannot be attributed to 
unobservable entrepreneurial characteristics. Of course, it is possible that MFIs themselves 
have self-selected to serve the most promising regions and this remains unresolved in 
traditional impact studies. To alleviate the supply-side self-selection, the empirical analysis    
includes controls for regional characteristics.
9 In this respect, a positive feature of the data is 
the random selection of municipalities in the Bosnian LSMS. 
4. DATA 
Microenterprise data come from Bosnia and Herzegovina Living Standards Measurement 
Study Survey, a part of the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) series of the 
World Bank, conducted by the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal 
Office of Statistics and the Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics in 2001.  While this is a 
household survey designed to measure the living standards of the population, in 2001 it 
included a section that asked households with enterprises about their businesses. The sample 
includes 25 municipalities out of total 146.
10 The total sample of the 2001 LSMS comprises 
5,400 households, of which 341 indicated that they owned businesses and provided complete 
answers to the private enterprise section of the survey. Since the target clientele of MFIs are 
less wealthy households, and since loans to microenterprises are usually defined as loans for 
self-employment and microenterprises, only enterprises with up to 10 employees were 
included in the analysis. The final sample consists of 294 observations. Sample weights from 
the original LSMS data are used throughout the analysis.   
MFI data and the municipalities they served come from the 2001 Annual Report by 
the Local Initiative Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which published a survey of the 
microfinance industry with detailed description of the geographic coverage by individual 
MFIs.
11 This report included all significant programs that operated in BiH in 2001 except 
PRIZMA and MICRA. The annual reports of these two MFIs were used to collect 
information on their geographic coverage. Data on the number of MFIs per municipality    
were then merged with the household enterprise data to create the database used in the 
analysis.   
Table 1 lists municipalities included in the database, their type (rural, urban, and 
mixed), and location (Republika Srpska or the Federation of BiH). It also lists the names of 
MFIs operating in each municipality, their collective assets base, and some characteristics of 
the lending methodologies they used in 2001. In addition to detailed data for geographic 
coverage by each MFI and its assets base from the LIP report, data on loan product 
characteristics were obtained from the 2001 Mapping Survey conducted by the Microfinance 
Center for CEE & NIS as well as from MFIs annual reports.
12 These data were used to 
classify municipalities as constrained and unconstrained.     
Table 1. Geographic distribution of microfinance institutions by municipalities  
Classification Micro- 
businesses
Municipality Type  Entity  MFI 
assets 
(mln) 
No 
MFI 
Main office  Branch  Lending Products  
Constrained 1  Cajnice Mixed    RS*  0 0     
Constrained  3 Grude  Rural    FBiH**  0  0     
Constrained  3 Kneževo  Rural  RS  0  0     
Constrained  18 Novi  Grad Urban  FBiH  7.3  1    Sunrise 
Constrained  4 Srpska  Ilidža  Urban  RS  7.3  1    Sunrise 
Constrained  3 Posušje  Rural  FBiH  13.9  1    EKI 
Constrained  8 N.Sarajevo  Urban  FBiH  11.1  2  Sunrise  Benefit 
Constrained  23 Novi  Grad Urban  RS  16.2  2    Sinergija,  Mikra 
Constrained  1 Višegrad  Mixed  RS  17.7  2    Benefit,  EKI 
Constrained  11 Zvornik  Rural RS  26  2    EKI,  Partner 
mostly individual 
lending (except EKI 
which offered limited 
group loans);  
target microenterprises 
with less than 5 
employees; 
targeted main city 
only; or only refugees; 
95 percent of loans 
less than 5,000KM 
Unconstrained  61 Banja  Luka  Urban  RS  26.5  3  Sinergija,Mikrofin  Mikra 
Unconstrained  9  Modrica  Mixed  RS  30  3    Sunrise, Partner, Mikrofin 
Unconstrained  19 Šamac  Rural RS  33.3  3    Partner,  Sunrise,  Sinergija 
Unconstrained  4 Breza  Mixed  FBiH  33.8  3    Partner, EKI, Sunrise 
Unconstrained  6 Vogošca  Mixed  FBiH 33.8  3    EKI,  Partner,  Sunrise 
Unconstrained  15  Gradacac  Rural  FBiH  36.5  3    EKI, LOK, Partner 
Unconstrained  16  Prijedor  Mixed  RS  37.4  3    EKI, Mikrofin, Sinergija 
Unconstrained  9  Srbac  Rural  RS  37.4  3    Mikrofin, Sinergija, EKI 
Unconstrained  19 Tuzla  Urban  FBiH  33.1  4  MI-BOSPO,   
Bosvita, Partner 
EKI 
Unconstrained  14  Sarajevo C.  Urban  FBiH  34  4  EKI, LOK, Mikra  Sunrise 
Unconstrained  11  Travnik  Mixed  FBiH  35.5  4    LOK, EKI, Prizma, Sunrise 
Unconstrained  2  Kakanj  Rural  FBiH  36.6  4    EKI, Partner, Mikra, Sunrise 
Unconstrained  11  Visoko  Mixed  FBiH  36.6  4    Mikra, Partner, EKI, Sunrise 
Unconstrained  11  Zavidovici  Rural  FBiH  39.9  4    Partner, Sunrise, EKI, MI-
BOSPO 
Unconstrained  12  Zenica  Urban   FBiH  46.6  5    EKI, LOK, Sunrise, Partner, 
Mikra 
individual and group 
loans available;  
larger loans (more 
than 5,000KM) 
available); 
collectively target 
more than one group 
(e.g refugees, women, 
unregistered 
businesses, or 
microenterprises with 
5-10 employees) 
 
  +Unweighted * RS stands for Republica Srpska ** FBiH stands for the Federation of BiH 
    
A municipality was classified as (credit) constrained if it had none or up to two MFIs 
and joint assets base of less than 30 mln KM.
13 Moreover, if only one or two MFIs operated 
in the constrained municipalities, they had a specific focus in terms of a target location (e.g. 
Benefit and Partner lent only in the main municipality town), or targeted microenterprises 
with less than 5 employees or, alternatively, a specific group (e.g. EKI targeted refugees) and 
over 95 percent of the loans of each MFI were for less than 5,000KM. In these 
municipalities, MFIs offered only individual loans restricting the pool of potential 
borrowers.
14  
In unconstrained municipalities, at least three MFIs operated and their asset base was 
at least 30 mln KM. The loans offered were relatively more varied and offered more options. 
For example, solidarity groups offered loans to borrowers with limited collateral; loans larger 
than KM 5,000 were also more prevalent. In addition, while individual MFIs targeted a 
specific group, collectively the three or more MFIs offered more choices to borrowers with 
different circumstances, e.g., women, refugees, unregistered microentrepreneurs and those 
with more than 5 employees. Thus, collectively, MFIs in unconstrained municipalities 
appealed to more types of potential clients.  
Money fungibility means that money received as a business loan may be used for 
personal or family consumption instead of productive purposes and that consumption credit 
may be used to alleviate financial constraints of the enterprise. Studies usually address the 
fungibility issue by widening the unit of analysis to include the financial portfolio of the 
entire household unit (Chen and Dunn, 1996).  Since the LSMS data contain household data, 
the cash flows of the enterprise and those of the household are used in the analysis.    
The LSMS dataset contains a section with detailed information on credit use by each 
member of the household.
15 Table 2 provides information on credit use by households 
owning microenterprises with less than 10 employees. Table 2 reveals that 31.7 percent of 
these households had loans from formal and informal sources (family and friends), and the 
average value of total amount borrowed was 5,224KM with loans ranging from 100KM to 
50,000KM.
16  The average amount borrowed by households with enterprises in constrained 
municipalities was 5,360 KM or slightly higher than the 5,190KM in unconstrained 
municipalities. Similar pattern is observed for the amount currently owed by the household 
and the amount of their most recent loan. 
 
Table 2. Experience with credit of households who own a microbusiness. 
   All Constrained  Unconstrained 
Percentage who reported value of the loan  31.7  28.1  33.6 
Value most recent loan in KM  4, 109  4,415  3,998 
 
Value owed (currently) in KM  3,992  5,231  3,474 
Value of all family loans (in KM for past year)   5,224  5,360  5,190 
Range 10-50K  100-50K  100-50K 
Loans by type       
  Banking loans (% of all loans)  28.8  33.8  26.8 
  Pawn loans (% of all loans) )  1.1  3.4  1.3 
  Roscas (% of all loans)  2.9  9.7  1.3 
  NGO and other (% of all loans)  15.2  5.9  19.3 
Rejection from formal source (% reported)  2  0  2.1 
Loans identifies as loan for business purposes (%)  28.4  45.1  21.4 
More than one formal loan (%)  2.4  3.4  2.0 
 
 
Table 2 also reveals that, compared to households in credit unconstrained 
municipalities, households in constrained municipalities used proportionally more bank debt 
(33.8 versus 26.8 percent respectively) and proportionally less credit from NGOs and other    
formal sources (5.9 versus 19.3 percent respectively). On average, the group of households in 
credit constrained municipalities identifies 45.1 percent of their loans as loans for business 
purposes, while the households in the unconstrained group identified 21.4 of their loans as 
loans for business purposes. Households in credit constrained municipalities were never 
rejected for a formal loan, which may indicate that many potential borrowers might not have 
even incurred the transaction cost to apply. Of the constrained group, 3.4 percent had more 
than one formal loan, while among households in unconstrained municipalities two percent 
had more than one loan. This result is consistent with Dunn and Tvrtkovic (2003) who report 
that only 1.2 percent of the clients with MFI loans had access to other types of formal loans. 
The survey first asks microentrepreneurs to list the type and value of fixed assets they 
have which include land, buildings, equipment and machines, furniture, small and large tools, 
vehicles (including small vehicles such as bicycles and wheel barrows) and other fixed assets 
and then asks if the entrepreneur had purchased such assets during the past 12 months. A 
dummy variable is constructed taking the value of 1 if the owner answered yes and zero 
otherwise. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis are presented in 
Table 3. Only 17.6 percent of the microenterprises in credit constrained municipalities, or 
constrained microenterprises, purchased fixed assets in the past year, while 28.4 percent of 
microenterprises in credit unconstrained municipalities or unconstrained microenterprises 
purchased fixed assets. 
 
 
    
Table 3. Variables definition and summary statistics, by credit constrained and unconstrained 
municipalities 
Variables Definition  Constrained Unconstrained 
Invested in past 
12 months 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if fixed assets were purchased in the 
past 12 months  
0.176 
(.071) 
0.284 
(.039) 
HHIncome   Household income (monthly salary plus 
social security payment for all family 
members in ‘000KM)  
4.254 
(2.112) 
3.596 
(0.576) 
Cash Flow  
 
Enterprise income minus expense 
(monthly in ‘000KM) 
1.672 
(0.835) 
0.703 
(0.132) 
Markets & Skills   A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the entrepreneur has indicated that 
non-financial issues were among the top 
three constraints in the past 12 months  
0.299 
(0.065) 
0.475 
(0.043) 
Mun_Income  Annual average household income in the 
municipality (‘000KM) 
8.127 
(.830) 
5.805 
(0.974) 
No employees  Number of paid employees   0.760 
(0.219) 
2.172 
(0.814) 
Fixed Assets 
 
Value of the fixed assets of the 
microenterprise(in ‘000KM) 
17.323 
(6.128) 
28.619 
(8.021) 
Enterprise age 
 
Age of the enterprise (years)  5.908 
(1.088) 
8.299 
(0.685) 
Female  A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the owner was a female; zero 
otherwise  
0.241 
(0.059) 
0.148 
(0.28) 
HH_Consumption  Annual household consumption (in 
‘000KM constructed by LSMS) 
3.184 
(0.569) 
1.437 
(0.077) 
No. non-formal 
loans  
 
Number of non-formal loans the family 
has had during the past 12 month 
4.369 
(0.289) 
4.208 
(0.111) 
Rural  A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the municipality is defined as rural 
in the LSMS survey, zero otherwise  
0.523 
(0.083) 
0.524 
(0.029) 
Urban  A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the municipality is defined as urban 
in the LSMS survey, zero otherwise  
0.219 
(0.048) 
0.193 
(0.017) 
Trade  A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the microbusiness is in trade 
according to LSMS definition, zero 
otherwise  
0.403 
(0.093) 
0.259 
(0.039) 
Service   A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the microbusiness is in service 
according to LSMS definition, zero 
otherwise 
0.454 
(0.087) 
0.538 
(0.043)    
Internal funds are measured with two variables. The first variable captures the cash-
flow of the enterprise and is constructed as monthly enterprise profits defined as the revenue 
minus total business related expenses. The second variable is the sum of annual household 
income from employment or social assistance payment and captures the non-business cash 
flow of the household. Households may use salaried (social security) income to purchase 
business equipment and may also use enterprise profits to improve consumption.  
Table 3 shows that compared to the unconstrained, constrained microenterprises 
generated higher levels of cash income (average monthly profits of 1,672KM versus 703KM 
for the unconstrained). Microenterprises in credit constrained municipalities had on average 
higher cash flows along the whole range of this variable, except for relatively high profit 
levels, that is, when own cash flows sufficed for investment in both groups. This is consistent 
with the notion that in credit constrained municipalities only enterprises generating sufficient 
cash flows operated and that some enterprises might have not been launched or expanded due 
to lack of access to credit. It also is consistent with the smaller percentage of investment in 
fixed capital in constrained municipalities. Thus, availability of microcredit should have an 
impact on investment through the financing constraints.  
This interpretation is also consistent with the data on return on assets (ROA), fixed 
assets and microenterprises distribution by sector. In municipalities with credit constraints, 
microenterprises were more likely to be in retail and trade, they were less profitable and less 
capital intensive than enterprises in municipalities with less severe credit constraints. In 
particular, constrained microenterprises had ROA of 0.25, average fixed assets of 17,232KM, 
and 40 percent worked in retail and trade. Unconstrained microenterprises had ROA of 0.78, 
fixed assets of 28,619KM and 26 percent operated in retail and trade.    
Annual household income generated from sources other than the microenterprise in 
constrained municipalities was higher (8,127KM) than that of the unconstrained (5,805KM) 
but the annual consumption by the households in constrained municipalities was also higher 
(3,184 KM) than that of households in unconstrained municipalities (1,437KM). These 
figures suggest that MFIs might have targeted more economically distressed areas. 
Investment opportunities are controlled for by two variables. The first variable is 
average annual income in the municipality described above. The expectation is that richer 
municipalities provide better opportunities for business expansion.  
A second variable called “Markets and Skills” is designed to capture the impact of 
business opportunities and is constructed as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a 
microentrepreneur indicated lack of clients or lack of own skills among the first three 
problems with his business. The expectation is that this variable captures opportunities for 
expansion that may not be easy to overcome. Only 30 percent of constrained 
microenterprises had problems with present markets and skills, versus 48.5 percent of the 
unconstrained microenterprises. 
Microenterprise-specific characteristics controlled for are age, size, activity type, and 
gender of the enterprise owner. Size of the enterprise is controlled for by including the value 
of fixed assets, as well as the number of non-family members employed in the enterprise. 
The model was estimated with both the number of all employees (including self-
employment) and number of hired non-family members. The latter specification is preferred 
because the financing constraints approach suggests controlling for operating expense when 
possible due to the substitutability between fixed and operating expense. Table 3 reveals that 
constrained microenterprises employed on average about one non-family member versus two    
employees for the unconstrained.  Constrained microenterprises were also smaller in size 
according to the size of their fixed assets.  
One reason for the smaller size of MFIs in constrained municipalities may be that 
microenterprises there formed later, as indicated by the younger age (5.9 years) of 
constrained versus the unconstrained microenterprises (8.3 years). In addition, consistent 
with the prevalence of retail and trade among constrained microenterprises, more women ran 
microbusinesses in the constrained municipalities with 24.1 percent, compared to 14.8 
percent run by women in unconstrained areas.  
 
5 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
Results of the estimation of logit models are presented in Table 4. Two specifications for 
each group—enterprises in credit constrained and in credit unconstrained municipalities—are 
estimated with the marginal effects or factor changes in the following column. The first 
specification is presented in columns 2-4, while columns 5 through 8 present results from 
specification that includes controls for type of activity of the enterprise such as production 
(omitted group), trade, and services, as well as the type of municipality: rural, urban and 
mixed (omitted group). 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Table 4. Logit regression results on microenterprises in constrained and unconstrained 
municipalities. 
  (1) Constrained  (1) Unconstrained  (2) Constrained  (2) Unconstrained 
  Coefficient Factor 
Change  
Coefficient Factor 
Change  
Coefficient Factor 
Change  
Coefficient Factor 
Change  
Constant  1.621   -0.841   3.221   -1.208   
  (1.06)   (0.80)   (1.75)*   (0.90)   
HHIncome  0.019 1.019  0.019 1.019  -0.015 0.985  0.021  1.021 
  (0.29)   (0.64)   (0.14)   (0.71)  
Cash Flow   0.677*** 1.967***  0.352*  1.422* 0.744*** 2.100***  0.423**  1.525** 
  (4.67)   (1.92)   (4.31)   (2.22)  
Markets & Skills   -0.007 0.993  1.329***  3.778***  0.178 1.195  1.197***  3.317*** 
  (0.01)   (3.10)   (0.22)   (2.70)  
Mun_Income  -0.361** 0.697**  -0.054  0.947  -0.442** 0.623**  -0.006  0.994 
  (2.44)   (0.40)   (2.02)   (0.03)  
No employees  -0.236 0.789  -0.004**  0.996**  -0.330 0.719  -0.003 0.997 
  (0.82)   (2.55)   (0.82)   (1.60)  
Fixed Assets  0.014 1.013  0.002 1.003  0.017 1.018  0.003**  1.003** 
  (1.47)   (1.45)   (1.13)   (2.00)  
Enterprise Age  -0.167  0.846 -0.054* 0.948*  -0.145 0.865  -0.082**  0.921** 
  (1.02)   (1.82)   (0.71)   (2.45)  
Female  -0.760 0.468  0.694  2.000  -0.628 0.534  1.040  2.830 
  (0.81)   (1.27)   (0.56)   (1.61)  
HHConsumption  -0.325 0.722  0.052  1.053  -0.222 0.801  0.104  1.109 
  (1.60)   (0.16)   (1.03)   (0.28)  
No. non-formal 
loans  
 
-0.046 
 
0.954 
 
-0.179 
 
0.836 
 
-0.054 
 
0.947 
 
-0.197 
 
0.822 
  (0.11)   (1.19)   (0.14)   (1.21)  
Rural        -0.043  0.958  0.337  1.401 
        (0.03)   (0.62)   
Urban        0.534  1.705  -0.219  .0803 
        (0.43)   (0.25)   
Trade        -1.941  0.143  -1.077  0.341 
        (1.02)   (1.13)   
Service        -1.403  0.246  0.633  1.883 
        (0.87)   (0.86)   
Other        -2.300  0.100  -0.011  0.989 
        (0.67)   (0.01)   
Pseudo Ftest  2.62 2.36 1.94 2.20 
Probability   (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 0.006 
Observations  75 219 75 219 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
The main interest is in the signs and magnitudes of the variables measuring 
availability of internal funds (Cash Flow and HHIncome) because they represent the 
sensitivity of investment to internal funds. As expected, the coefficients on Cash Flow are 
statistically significant.  The magnitudes of these coefficients are consistent with the 
hypothesis that MFIs improve the credit market and alleviate credit constraints since    
enterprises in municipalities with three or more MFIs face less severe financing constraints. 
Specifically, according to the first model, and in the group of constrained enterprises 
(municipalities without MFIs), for each additional 1,000 KM in monthly profit the odds of 
investing in fixed capital increase by a factor of 1.97, while the odds of investing increase by 
the lower factor of 1.42 in the sample of microenterprises operating in credit unconstrained 
municipalities. Thus, investing in the constrained group is more sensitive to availability of 
internal funds than is investment in the unconstrained group. The difference of a factor of 
0.545 is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In the second specification, the 
difference in the odds is 0.575 and is statistically significant at the 7 percent level.  
This is also illustrated on Figure 1 where investment probabilities are related to 
internal funds along the range of that variable. In Figure 1, the probability of investing is 
calculated for various levels of cash flows.
17 The results consistently indicate differences in 
investment probabilities for the two groups with estimated probabilities of investing, for the 
same level of internal funds consistently higher in credit constrained municipalities. In 
addition, investment probability is different from zero even for negative values of cash flows 
consistent with the theoretical model of Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007). 
 
  Figure 1. Predicted investment probability as a function of cash flows 
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Results presented in Table 4 also show that, while investment depends on internal 
funds in credit constrained municipalities, it is does not depend on household income, as 
coefficients of HHincome are not statistically significant in any of the regressions. The 
reason for that is probably the separation (for investment purposes) between household and 
business income. Other household characteristics such as gender of the enterprise owner, 
household consumption, and household access to non-formal loans also do not affect 
investment.  
In unconstrained municipalities, micrenterprises where lack of skills and markets 
were among the top three problems in the current business were more likely to invest, 
perhaps in order to take advantage of new opportunities. This relation is not observed in 
microenterprises in credit constrained municipalities.  
The results also show that older microenterprises in the unconstrained municipalities 
were less likely to invest, consistent with a notion that microbusinesses have a lifecycle with 
heavier investment needs at earlier age. Holding all else constant, similar evidence for a 
lifecycle investment is not observed in microbusinesses in constrained municipalities perhaps 
because these businesses could not take full advantage of the available opportunities. The 
interpretation of these results is consistent with the theoretical conjecture and the empirically 
observed substitutability between hiring more employees and investing in fixed assets in 
unconstrained microenterprises. No such relation is found in the credit constrained 
municipalities where limited access to capital might have prevented businesses from taking 
advantage of productive opportunities either by buying (renting productive capital) or by 
hiring labor. On the other hand, holding consumption constant, microbusinesses located in 
wealthier constrained municipality, were less likely to have invested in their businesses than    
those in poorer constrained municipalities, perhaps because in wealthier credit-constrained 
municipalities people could earn alternative income. No such relation is found in 
unconstrained municipalities.  
The second model presented in the last four columns of Table 4 adds industry 
dummies for trade and service with production as the omitted dummy as well as dummies for 
urban, rural and mixed (the omitted category) municipality. Previous impacts of cash flow, 
investment opportunity, enterprise age and municipality wealth are the same as in model one. 
Inclusion of industry and regional dummies only makes the coefficient on size in 
unconstrained municipalities statistically significant and the coefficient on number of 
employees statistically insignificant, possibly due to the correlation between these two 
variables. The variance inflation factor, however, is less than 10 and it does not suggest a 
strong multicollinearity. 
Usually, microenterprises in production activities are more capital intensive than 
those in trade, services, and other activities. The evidence does not show that investment in 
industries like trade and services differs significantly from that in production in both types of 
municipalities. This eliminates possible concerns that investment may differ across sectors 
and is consistent with the theory suggested by Clearly, Rovel and Raith (2007) where the 
decision to invest and the size of investment are jointly determined by entrepreneurs.  
For the two types of municipalities, investment in rural and in urban municipalities is 
not statistically different than that in mixed municipalities, where presumably more 
opportunities for both urban and rural type businesses exist. These variables together with the 
industry type and average family income by municipality are reassuring that municipality    
characteristics are controlled for although it is possible that supply-side selection issues 
persist to the extent that salient municipality characteristics cannot be fully measured. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses the financing constraint approach to study the impact of microfinance on 
access to credit for microenterprises in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It uses data collected from 
the Living Standards Measurement Survey of the World Bank, the Local Initiative Project 
and the Association of Bosnian Microfinance Institutions. The approach is an alternative to 
traditional microfinance impact studies relying on specific and costly muliti-year surveys 
associated with challenges in empirical implementation and possible sample bias. Moreover, 
while traditional studies evaluate the impact of a single MFI, the approach used in this paper 
evaluates the impact of the microfinance industry as a whole and, thus, could capture 
important issues such as oversupply of microcredit and possibly over-indebtedness.  
Since 2001, the World Bank has conducted a scaled back version of the LSMS in 
other countries with transition economies and did not collect data from self-employed 
individuals and those who run microenterprises. This is unfortunate, because these are 
precisely the businesses missed from larger scale studies such as the World Bank’s Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.  Scarce development assistance funds 
should be used efficiently and this paper shows that LSMS data could provide valuable 
insights on how well initiatives designed to help the poor work. 
The data and method employed here produce results consistent with more traditional 
impact study on Bosnia for the same period. They show that MFIs improved access to credit 
in municipalities where two or more MFIs offered financial products because investment in    
local microenterprises was less sensitive to availability of internal funds than was investment 
in microenterprises in municipalities where microfinance activities were limited or non-
existent and where microentrepreneurs had to rely more on internal funds for investment. 
This methodology is appropriate for other countries where LSMS or similar large 
scale household surveys are conducted and where data on geographic distribution of MFIs 
branches can be assembled.  Popularity of microfinance forces MFIs to be more transparent 
and decreases the cost of assembling a database with MFIs branch distribution, therefore 
making the financing constraints approach more attractive.    
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1 A micro enterprise is defined as business with ten or fewer employees, one or more of whom owns the 
enterprise.   
2 Microfinance institutions target the relatively poor who are below or close to the poverty line and who usually 
have the (entrepreneurial) skills to undertake some activity but lack access to credit. 
3  Traditionally, the Ohio State School argued that a focus on social objectives is misplaced because only clients 
of sustainable financial institution gain economically while clients of subsidized institutions aiming at social 
objectives do no. These conclusions were drawn from the experience of heavily regulated development banks 
which in the 1980 employed price (interest rate) and quantity (targeted credit) controls to redistribute income in 
favor of small producers, to promote adoption of technology, and to eliminate moneylenders. As a result, banks 
lent to large farmers to cover higher screening and monitoring costs. These farmers defaulted on their 
subsidized loans because they already had access to loans from unsubsidized sources. Banks were left with 
smaller loanable funds to lend to poor farmers and this adverse income redistribution undermined the 
development of rural financial markets (Gonzalez-Vega, 1977; Adams et al., 1984).  Re-evaluation of some of 
the data shows that subsidized banks achieved social objectives and suggest that measuring the social impact of 
MFIs is also important (Smith, 2002; Binswanger and Khandker 1995).  
4 Convertible Mark, or KM, is the currency of the sate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The exchange rate was fixed 
by a currency board at 1KM=1DM through end-2001 and KM=0.51 Euro since January 1, 2002. 
5 For more details see http://www.ids.ac.uk/impact/ 
6 This approach has been modified to account for the impact of working capital and other issues.  Advantages 
and disadvantages of the approach are also discussed in Hubbard, 1998. 
7 Usually these are either a t-test (F-test) for difference in slopes on the investment coefficients (and other 
coefficients) across groups or the equivalent Chow test to establish if two separate regressions for each group 
are needed.  
8 The model also makes the empirically relevant assumption that some firms may have negative levels of 
internal funds and even negative net worth, applicable to microenterprises with few tangible assets but valuable 
growth opportunities. This theoretical model addresses previous criticism of the financing constraints approach.     
                                                                                                                                                       
9 Some bias may persist to the extent that salient regional characteristics cannot be fully measured.  
10 Overall 25 out of the 146 municipalities were selected. For detailed information, see 
http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/country/bih/bih01home.html. 
11 The report is available in English at www.odraz.ba.  
12 The survey is described in details in Foster and Pytkowska (2003). 
13 One exception is Banja Luka (the center of Republika Srpska ) with 26.5mln assets. It is classified as 
unconstrained because it had three MFIs and as a whole they offered less restrictive loan products than the pairs 
of MFIs in the group of constrained municipalities.  
14 Sinergija is an exception because it offered individual and solidarity group loans but it was a very small MFI 
with limited reach. 
15 The credit section was completed during the first visit. The section on household enterprise was completed 
during a follow up visit to households engaged in entrepreneurial activities, and the interviews were with the 
household members most familiar with the enterprise. It may be possible that business related credit information 
was not revealed during the first visit; thus, linking household credit to investment in the business is not 
prudent.  
16 All averages are weighted by the appropriate sample weights.  
17 Calculations are based on estimation results from Model 1, Table 4.   
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